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Analysing the relationship between military spending and growth has been an important 
area of empirical research. Early studies focussed on large cross sections of countries, but 
criticisms of these led to a focus on case studies of individual countries and studies of 
groups of relatively homogeneous countries. Granger causality methods have also become 
common techniques for such analyses, both as single equation analyses and more recently, 
within a cointegrating VAR framework. This paper does two things. First it provides an 
empirical analysis of three of the EU’s poorest, peripheral economies, namely Greece, 
Portugal and Spain. It also considers the range of available Granger causality techniques 
and compares their results. It finds that the results differ across the methods used, 
indicating the problems with earlier studies, and across the countries, indicating the 
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  11. Introduction 
 
 
In the post Cold War world the opportunity of reduced military expenditures may provide a 
means of improving the relative economic performance of a number of countries. This will 
of course only benefit the economies if military spending does not play a positive role in 
their economic development. Yet the economic effects of military spending remain a topic 
of considerable debate, despite the fact that it has been an important area of empirical 
research and has produced a large literature. The earliest studies following (?) were on 
large cross sections of countries, but criticisms of these led to a focus on case studies of 
individual countries and studies of groups of relatively homogeneous countries. The 
methods of analysis have also changed, from simple cross country correlation analyses to 
regression analyses and to more advanced time series methods (Dunne,1996). In recent 
years Granger causality methods have become common techniques for such an analyses, 
both as single equation analyses and more recently, within a cointegrating VAR 
framework.  The increasing sophistication of the methods used has failed to lead to any 
clear result and the debate continues. 
 
This paper makes a contribution to the ongoing debate by investigating the relation 
between military burden and growth for three relatively similar countries, the peripheral 
economies of the European Union, namely Greece, Portugal and Spain. They have the 
potential to benefit from improved security arrangements within the EU and Europe, which 
could allow them to reduce their military burdens. It uses Granger causality techniques and 
compares the results from the different methods. Section 2, provides an outline of the 
development of the three economies and of their military expenditures. Section 3 briefly 
discusses the defence-growth nexus, section 4 introduces the methods used and presents 
some results. Finally, section 5 presents some conclusions. 
 
 
2. Greece, Spain and Portugal 
 
Greece, Spain and Portugal make an interesting group of countries for analysis. They have 
all emerged from dictatorial rule, which in the case of the two Iberian countries, lasted for 
several decades and as Tsoukalis (1981) observed “had turned the three countries into 
  2observers of the international system”.  After more than a decade of uninterrupted growth 
in Western Europe, the recession of the mid-seventies also saw the collapse of the 
dictatorships in the three Mediterranean countries (mid-70s). The transition towards 
parliamentary democracy led to internal political and economic changes and a desire for 
international recognition. Starting with Greece the countries came to see membership of 
the European Community as a means of strengthening their economic and political 
situation. When they did join, their relative economic backwardness made them the poorest 
countries in the EU. 
 
There are many similarities in terms of their economic performance but at the same time 
some differences in terms of the pattern of their military expenditure.  Figure 1, shows the 
real growth of GDP for the three countries from 1960-2002, illustrating the similar patterns 
for the countries, with Spain performing slightly better over the period. 
 

































































































*calculated from figures in 1995 mn Euros. Source: Eurostat 
 
During the period 1960-1973 all three countries enjoyed higher rates of growth than the 
rest of the EC or even any individual member country, with low inflation and 
unemployment rates (Tsoukalis, 1981).  This situation was soon followed by a period of 
both high inflation and unemployment, with unemployment particularly high in Spain.    
This depression in the early 1970s which coincided with the collapse of the dictatorships in 
  3all three countries (for Greece these coincided with the Turkish invasion of Cyprus as 
well), is reflected in the negative growth of GDP, reaching at around -5% for Greece and 
Portugal in 1974 and 1975, respectively, while Spain managed to avoid the “below zero” 
rate. This crisis led to a huge drop in investment for all the countries and substantial 
increases in Government debt after 1975, a problem that has become more serious over the 
last two decades, especially for Greece. 
 





































As Figure 2 shows there are clear differences in the evolution of the countries military 
burden. Spain had throughout the period the lowest military burden among the three 
countries, and it remained stable at around 2% of GDP, with a slight increase in the 1980s 
(due to the development of the arms industry and the expansion of production).  But when 
it comes to Portugal and Greece, things are quite different.  Clearly, 1974 was a critical 
year for both countries, as can be seen from Figure 2. Portugal had a high military burden 
(higher than Greece) for the years prior to 1974 and after that a dramatically decreased one.  
Exactly the opposite pattern is observed for Greece that before 1974 had a lower military 
burden compared to the years after 1974.  The reduction of the Portuguese military burden 
after 1974 was attributed to the end of the dictatorship but most importantly to the end of 
the Colonial Empire.   For Greece, the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974 marked a huge 
  4increase in military burden, which has remained high since then due to continuous 
disagreements and conflicts with the neighbouring country.  These features are particularly 
important when analysing empirically the defence-growth relationship. 
 
3. Analysing the Military Spending-Growth nexus 
 
Most of the studies on the defence-growth relationship are based on the Neoclassical or 
Keynesian theoretical frameworks, which allow the development of consistent formal 
models.  Neoclassical models concentrate on supply-side (modernisation, positive 
externalities from infrastructure, technological spin-offs), with the main empirical focus 
being the estimation of the Feder-Ram model
2. Keynesian models concentrate on demand-
side (crowding-out of investment, exports, education, health). In order to overcome the 
problem of concentrating on the demand or supply-side only, efforts to include both 
influences have been made.  These models capture the demand-side influences in a 
Keynesian aggregate demand function and the supply-side ones in a growth equation, 
which is derived from a production function
3.  These models hypothesise possible direct 
effects of defence on growth through Keynesian demand stimulation and other spin-off 
effects and negative indirect effect through reductions in savings or investment.   They 
usually include three or four equations one of which is a growth equation and the others a 
savings or investment equation, a trade balance ratio and a defence burden one.  Although 
these models provide a more complete picture of the defence-growth relationship by 
accounting for the interrelationships between the variables, they have been criticised for 
not being strongly based on theory and thus, relying on more ad-hoc justifications.   
 
An alternative approach, is to examine the series without developing a structural model. 
Using Vector Autoregressive (VAR) models has the advantage that they are dynamic 
specifications, free of economic assumptions imposed a priori.  Thus, they allow for the 
testing of causal linkages without the need to first construct arguments and develop 
hypotheses justifying those linkages (Georgiou et al., 1996). Research into direction of 
statistical (Granger) causality between defence and growth has become a commonly used 
                                                           
2 See Biswas and Ram (1986), Alexander (1990), Mintz and Huang (1990), Mintz and Stevenson (1995), 
Sezgin (1996), Murdoch, Pi and Sandler (1997), Nikolaidou (1998), Batchelor et al. (2000).  Dunne et al 
(2005) provide a critique. 
  5method in the literature.  Researchers, such as Kinsella and Chung (1998) and Dunne and 
Vougas (1999), began to develop the analysis to allow for long run information in the data. 
In their analysis of South Africa, Dunne and Vougas (1999) found that this changed the 
results from an insignificant positive Granger causality from military burden to growth to a 
significant negative one. They argued that failing to take account of the long run 
information led to misspecification of the estimating equation. But although they used a 
VAR framework for their analysis, they employed the Engle-Granger simple two-stage 
cointegration procedure and this has been superseded in the literature by the Johansen’s 
cointegrating VAR framework. This paper uses this approach and compares it with the 





Within the literature there have been a number of approaches to using the concept of 
Granger causality to study the military spending growth nexus
4. Such tests  presume the 
use of stationary data and so augmented Dickey-Fuller (1979) unit root tests (ADF), using 
an autoregression that includes only an intercept or both an intercept and a linear trend are 
applied. The standard Granger causality test then assumes that the information for the 
prediction of the variables SMt, the share of military spending in GDP, and Yt, GDP, is 
contained only in the time-series data of these variables.  The test involves estimating the 
following regressions: 
 










t-j  + u1t                                                   










t-j + u2t                                    
The first equation postulates that current SM is related to past values of SM itself as well 
as of Y and the second postulates similar behaviour for Y.  Generally, if SM Granger 
causes Y, then changes in SM should precede changes in Y.  Therefore, in a regression of 
                                                                                                                                                                                
3 This framework was first developed by Smith and Smith (1980) and since then further developed by Deger 
and Smith (1983), Lim (1983), Faini, Annez and Taylor (1984), Deger (1986), Scheetz (1991), Chletsos and 
Kollias (1995), Antonakis (1997), Dunne et al (2000), Dunne and Nikolaidou (2001), Klein (2004).  
4 Granger causality studies include: Joerding (1986), Chowdhury (1991), Chen (1993), Kollias & Makrydakis 
(1997), Dunne et al (2001), Atesoglu (2002), Kollias et al (2004), Karagol and Palaz (2004). 
  6Y on other variables (including its own past values) if we include past or lagged values of 
SM and it significantly improves the prediction of Y, then we can say that SM Granger 
causes Y and vice versa for SM.  As mentioned, this analysis was developed to allow for 
long run information in the data, by testing for cointegration and if found introducing an 
error correction terms to the equations above (Dunne and Vougas, 1999). 
 
In the analysis we follow other contributors in looking at the relation between output and 
military burden. This is not unproblematic as there is no specific underlying structural 
theoretical model and it is not clear what the identifying assumption should be. This means 
the results can be open to alternative theoretical interpretation
5. 
 
It has been claimed (see Harris, 1995) that unit roots tests often suffer from poor size and 
power properties (i.e. the tendency to over-reject the null hypothesis of non-stationarity 
when it is true and under-reject the null when it is false, respectively).  This has meant that 
in practical applications, it is quite common for there to be tests for cointegration even 
when the preceding unit root analysis suggests that the properties of the variables in the 
equation are unbalanced (i.e. they cannot cointegrate down to a common lower order of 
integration).  This might be justified on the grounds that the unit root tests are not reliable, 
and consequently the variables may indeed all be, say, I(1). It is also not necessary for all 
the variables in the model to have the same order of integration.  Using this approach, we 
test for a cointegrating relationship and if one exists, we impose restrictions on the vector 
and estimate the restricted Error Correction Models (ECMs)
6.  
 
The reduced form of the system for Y and the share of military expenditure in SM for the 
three countries can be written in VECM (Vector Error Correction Model) form of a first 
order VAR (Vector Autoregression) specification (see Smith et al, 1999) as: 
 
∆Yt = δ11 +  δ12 Yt-1 +  δ13 SMt-1 + u1t                       
 
∆SM2t = δ21 + δ22 Yt-1 + δ23 SMt-1 + u2t                     
 
                                                           
5 For example, the identifying assumption could be that the income elasticitity of demand for military 
expenditure was unity and so the results were supply effects. On the other hand it could be argued that the 
results reflect differences of the elasticity from one.  
 
6 Studies using these techniques include Birdi and Dunne (2002), Kollias et al (2004) 




i , Ε(uitujt) = ωij , Ε(uitujt-s ) = 0,  where s≠0 and i, j =1,2. There 
will be Granger (1969) causality from Y to SM if  δ22 ≠0 and from SM to Y if  δ13 ≠0.   
 
If the long-run relationship is Yt = βSMt, then the disequilibrium is measured by  zt = Yt - 
βSMt and the VECM takes the form: 
 
∆Yt =δ11 + α1 zt-1                                             
 
∆SMt =δ21 + α2 zt-1                                           
 





Our empirical analysis starts with an analysis of the three countries data, using the  
logarithm of GDP (Yt) and the military burden (SMt) for the period 1960-2002. Prior to 
applying Granger causality tests we need to establish the integration properties of the time 
series. We apply the Dickey-Fuller (1979) unit root tests (DF), using an autoregression that 
includes only an intercept or both an intercept and a linear trend.  For Greece and Portugal 
(considering log GDP with an intercept and a trend and SM with only an intercept) the 
results are consistent, the null hypothesis of a unit root cannot be rejected for any of the 
series, but can be rejected for the first differences of the series, implying that the series are 
I(1).  Spain gives rather different result, suggesting that both series are I(2), though this is 
marginal for SM
7. Given these results we test for cointegration using the two stage Engle 
Granger procedure, estimating the levels regression for Greece and Portugal and the 
difference regression for Spain and testing the residuals for unit roots. 
 
                                                           
7 For LGDP with trend and allowing up to 6 lags: The data for Greece gives ADF(1) = -2.56 with 95% 
critical value -3.54 and for LGDP differenced without trend -3.09 and -2.94 respectively (reducing the 
maximum lacks makes the rejection more straightforward); For Portugal ADF(4) = -2.95 with 95% critical 
value -3.54 and for difference without trend ADF(3) = -3.25 and critical value -2.94; For Spain ADF(2) = -
2.77 with 95% critical value -3.54 and for difference without trend ADF(1) =-2.46 and critical value -2.94 
and for second difference without trend ADF(1) -5.97and critical value -2.95 
For SM without trend and allowing up to 6 lags: The data for Greece gives ADF(3) = -2.07 with 95% critical 
value -2.94 and for SM differenced without trend ADF(1) = -4.42 and critical value -2.94; For Portugal 
ADF(1) = -0.98 with 95% critical value -3.54 and for difference without trend ADF(1) = -4.96 and critical 
value -2.94; For Spain ADF(2) = -1.65 with 95% critical value -2.94 and for difference without trend ADF(1) 
=-2.44 and critical value -2.94 and for second difference without trend ADF(1) -5.02 and critical value -2.95. 
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The static model results and the ADF test results (with t ratios in parentheses) are:  
For Greece:          Yt = 10.42  +   0.13 SMt +   εt                                                                               
                                   (35.20)       (2.30) 
ADF(0) = -0.132, 95% critical value -3.51 
For Spain:             DYt = 13.36  -   0.35 DSMt +   ζt                                                                              
                                 (33.93)       (1.54) 
ADF(0) = -2.18, 95% critical value -3.51 
For Portugal:         Yt  = 11.69   -  0.25 SMt +  θt                                                   
                                                  (110.6)       (9.86) 
ADF(0) = -2.18, 95% critical value -3.51 
(t-ratios in parentheses) 
 
In all cases the DF test is chosen which tests the restriction ρ=0 in a regression of the form: 
∆ut = α + ρut-1 + εt
Where ut is the estimated residual. Thus the failure to reject the null hypothesis means that 
ut is not I(0) and so the hypothesis of a unit root cannot be rejected. This means 
surprisingly that there is no evidence of cointegration for any of the countries  
 
Before testing for Granger causality there is another issue we should deal with. The pattern 
of the country data suggest that we need to consider the possibility of structural breaks and 
we attempt to deal with these using dummy variables. Specifically, for Greece a dummy is 
required for 1974, the year of the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, for Portugal a dummy for 
the period 1960-1974 (the period of the dictatorship which was accompanied by increased 
military spending)  and for Spain a dummy for 1982-88 (during this period war broke out 
between Britain and Argentina over the Falkland islands and Spain supported Argentina’s 
claims, it took active part in Condadora group and was very successful in arms exports to 
Middle East and Latin America).   
 
Estimating a general first order model in error correction form: 
∆Yt = a0 + a1 ∆SMt + α2 Yt-1 + α3 SMt-1 + a4 Dt + ut                 
∆SMt = β0 + β1 ∆Yt + β2 SMt-1 +  β3 Yt-1 + β4 Dt + εt    
gave rather poor results. Testing  the exclusion restrictions a1= a3 =0 on the first equation 
and β1 = β3 = 0 on the second suggested no Granger causality either way for Greece, only 




Moving on to use the preferable cointegrating VAR approach we test for the order of the 
VAR
9. Starting with a VAR(4) in growth, military burden and the relevant dummy variable 
suggested that we should have a VAR(2) for Greece, a VAR(1) for Portugal and a VAR(1) 
in differences for Spain. Starting with Greece the cointegrating VAR procedure with 
unrestricted intercepts and restricted trends gave results for the Likelihood ratio tests that 
reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration in favour of the alternative of one 
cointegrating vector, with the Schwarz selection criterion concurring. Estimating the 
VECM gives a long-run solution where military burden has a significant positive effect on 
log output, with a significant positive trend:   
 
Y = 0.255 SM + 0.042 Trend 
         (3.58)         (6.83)                              
 
the error correction models are: 
 
∆Yt =  - 0.526 + 0.231 ∆Yt-1 + 0.015 ∆SMt-1 + 0.062 Zt-1 - 0.143 D74t          
                 (3.48)    (1.94)             (2.10)             (3.63)         (5.28)   
R
2 =0.58; SER=0.02; DW=1.64 
 
∆SMt = -11.866 – 8.326 ∆Yt-1 + 0.170 ∆SMt-1 + 1.361 Zt-1 – 0.169 D74t           
            (4.43)     (3.95)              (1.32)                (4.49)          (0.35)   
            R
2 =0.41; SER=0.45; DW=2.14 
(t-ratios in brackets) 
 
Imposing the restriction that the coefficients of ∆SMt-1 and Zt-1 in the first equation are zero 
was rejected by the Wald test, χ
2(2) = 15.97 [.000] and similarly for ∆Yt-1 and Zt-1 in the 
second equation with χ2(2) = 24.49 [.000]. This suggests there is Granger causality from 
military burden to growth and vice versa. The short run effect of military burden on growth 
is positive, but the equilibrium adjustment will be negative. However, the coefficients on 
                                                           
8 LR tests for Granger causality from SM to Y gave for Greece Portugal and Spain,  with p values in 
brackets: 2.5 (.28); 4.20 (.12); 13.37 (.00) and from Y to SM 0.70 (.74);  8.7 (.01); 15.92 (.00). Results for 
Spain for second difference form were 0.30 (.86) and 0.81 (0.6) respectively.  
9 Since the Engle Granger test uses the residuals of an OLS regression, it relies on an arbitrary choice of 
normalisation. The more sophisticated VAR approaches use systems of equations that treat variables 
symmetrically.   
  10the error correction terms are both positive, which implies the feedbacks are not stabilising 
and raising concerns about the specification.. 
 
Moving on to Portugal, we find one cointegrating relation suggested by the tests and 
selection criteria and estimating a cointegrating VAR with unrestricted intercepts and 
restricted trends gives a long-run solution:  
  
Y = 0.675 SM + 0.060 Trend 
        (2.28)          (0.47)                
 
and error correction model results: 
∆Yt =  -0.034 -0.008 Z t-1 + 0.048 D6074                                 
              (0.5)   (0.9)            (2.9) 
R
2 =0.31; SER=0.03; DW=1.64 
 
∆SMt =  -0.803 – 1.066 Z t-1 + 1.98D6074     
               (11.6)      (11.4)         (11.8)                                  
 R
2 =0.79; SER=0.27; DW=2.03 
 
In the growth equation, the restriction that the coefficient of Z t-1 is zero cannot be rejected 
χ
2 (1) = 0.812 [.367], while for the growth equation it can  χ
2(1) = 129.11 [.000], 
suggesting Granger causality from growth to military burden, but not the other way round. 
 
Moving on to the Spanish data, with unrestricted intercepts and restricted trends, the results 
suggest the existence of one cointegrating relationship in the differences. The long run 
relationship is:  
∆Y = -0.524 ∆SM - 0.002 Trend 
           (2.95)           (3.4)   
                        
With the error correction model results: 
 
∆∆Yt =  -0.0003  + 0.056 Zt-1  + 0.014 D8288                                  
                (0.07)       (0.91)         (1.69)   
R
2 =0.07; SER=0.02; DW=2.33 
 
∆SMt =  0.163 –  2.22 Zt-1 + 0.038 D8288                                               
                  (6.10)   (7.11)      (0.92)                             
 R
2 =0.15; SER=0.10; DW=1.84 
 
For the growth equation, the restriction that the coefficient of Zt-1 is zero cannot  be 
rejected χ
2 (1) = 6.827 [.363], but it can for the military burden equation,  χ
2 (1) = 50.56 
  11[.000], suggesting Granger causality from growth to the change in military burden, but not 
vice versa. A similar result to that for Portugal, though in the case of Spain we are dealing 
with I(2) variables.  
 
 
Table 1. Summary of results (1960-2002) 
Approach Country  SM → Y  Y→ SM 
Greece  No   No 
Spain  No No 
Regression  
 
Portugal  No Yes   
Greece  Yes Yes   
Spain  No Yes 
Cointegrating VAR 
 
Portugal  No Yes   
 
 
5.  Conclusions 
 
 
This paper has investigated the relationship between economic growth and military burden 
in the three peripheral countries of the European Union, Greece, Spain and Portugal. Their 
economic similarities and security differences make them an interesting object of analysis 
as they represent the relatively homogeneous groups of countries that much of the recent 
work in the area has focused. In the empirical analysis the paper also went beyond the 
usual tests of Granger causality used in the literature, adopting a VAR methodology and 
allowing for cointegration between the variables.  
 
Unit root tests suggested that military burden and output, for Greece and Portugal, and the 
change in military burden and growth, for Spain, were all I(1). Using the Engle Granger 
two stage procedure to test for cointegration, by testing the residuals of the levels 
regression for a unit root, suggested that the series were not cointegrated. Adding dummy 
variables to deal with various security issues and estimating a dynamic model, only found 
evidence of Granger causality from output to military burden in Portugal. Adopting the 
cointegrating VAR framework, suggested single cointegrating relations for all three 
countries. There was evidence of Granger causality from military burden to output only for 
  12Greece, though there was evidence for all three countries the other way. One reason why 
the Spanish data may be giving strange results is that unlike Greece and Turkey, Spain has 
seen little in the way of exogenous shocks, meaning there is little information in the data. It 
is, however, worth noting that these results are rather different to those found by 
Nikolaidou (1998b) on slightly shorter time period.  
 
Overall, there is no general empirical conclusion that can be drawn as to the economic 
effects of military spending on these small industrialised economies. The results show the 
difficulty of making judgements even across a group of relatively homogeneous countries. 
They also illustrate the difficulties in using Granger causality analyses and suggest that it is 
important that the long run information in the data is taken into account. While the use of 
the cointegrating VAR methods is a considerable improvement on earlier methods, it is 
clear that the techniques must be used with care as results can be sensitive to changes in 
the sample period and to structural breaks. It is important to remember that the time series 
properties we find are for the data series in a particular time period, not the variable itself. 
Also, as we mentioned the practice of looking for Granger causal links between output and 
military burden can be problematic as the lack of a specific structural model makes 
identification difficult. It is difficult to interpret what the results mean, whether they are 
picking up demand or supply effects. Thus, while the literature may be improving 
technically it seems it is no closer to reaching a conclusion and will need to be more 
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